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Abstract
Given the fact that in a context of crises, people are concerned with their safety, among other 
things, partisan response toward policies and public leaders is an intriguing topic. This article 
examines the extent to which partisanship pertains to the time of the Covid-19 pandemic.  We 
employ natural language processing (NLP) and social network analysis (SNA) on Twitter data 
to analyse public responses toward prominent political leaders, namely, Indonesian President 
Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan (Anies), in handling the crisis of 
the Covid-19 pandemic in Indonesia. We then put the social media analysis in a framework of 
political partisanship. Our sentiment analysis through NLP across time and categories found that 
supports and demands towards the two public figures indicate positive and negative partisanship 
that replicates previous electoral supports. Similarly, our SNA indicates a high polarization rate 
among the accounts connected with the two leaders in response to the crisis. Extended analysis of 
the accounts who are at the epicentres of the sentiment conversations, either positive or negative 
about Jokowi and Anies, reveals that there are connections with their past political support. Though 
we find negative partisan responses for both leaders, a type of hard-core partisanship has been 
leveraged for Jokowi but not for Anies. We conclude that electoral polarization contributes to the 
extent to which partisanship responses circulate in a context of crisis.
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Introduction
A group protesting against the stay-at-
home order regarding the Covid-19 pandemic 
erupted in Michigan, United States of America, 
on April 15, 2020. News reports and social 
media posts around the globe, hereafter, 
portrayed a series of similar demonstrations 
in other places in the United States of America. 
Further news investigation reveals that the 
sympathizers of Donald Trump were behind 
the protests (see, for instance, Reid, 2020). 
Partisanship response in a context of crisis—a 
situation where people were concerned 
with their safety, among other things—is an 
intriguing fact. As Page and Shapiro (1983) 
suggested a long time ago that “public opinion 
is often a proximate cause of policy, affecting 
policy more than policy influences opinion”, 
it is imperative to systematically investigate 
further in other places with particular contexts. 
To what extent does partisanship occur and 
circulate in the context of crisis? How do such 
partisan responses shape the whole response 
during the crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic? 
And what is the explanation(s) of such partisan 
responses? 
Related to these questions, we seek to 
investigate partisanship in Indonesian contexts, 
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one of the most significant new democracies 
with electoral polarization in the last two 
elections (see Arifianto, 2019). In doing so, we 
employed natural language processing (NLP) 
and social network analysis (SNA) on Twitter 
from March to April 2020 to analyse responses 
toward two leaders, the Indonesian president 
Joko Widodo, later written as Jokowi and the 
governor of Indonesian capital of Jakarta Anies 
Baswedan, later written as Anies, in handling 
the crisis of Covid-19. We contend that electoral 
polarization contributes to the extent to which 
partisanship responses circulate in a crisis 
context.  Applying NLP to analyse the pattern 
of conversation frequencies across time (time 
series analysis) and categories (clustered 
analysis), our findings suggest that supports 
and demand towards the two public figures 
indicate positive and negative partisanship 
that replicates previous electoral supports. 
Similarly, our SNA indicates a high degree of 
polarization among the thousands of accounts 
connected with the two leaders in response to 
the crisis. Extended analyses of the accounts 
who are the epicentres of the sentiment 
conversations, either positive or negative 
about Jokowi and Anies reveal that there are 
connections with their past political support. 
This argument challenges ‘conventional’ 
rational-economic arguments on public 
response where analyses are mainly based 
on researchers’ designed questions or studies 
in normal realms. Related to debates on 
literature about public responses, similar to 
what Page and Shapiro (1983) argue, there is 
a body of literature suggesting that there is an 
interconnection between public response and 
public policy such as the relationship between 
public preferences and public expenditure 
(see Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). Some suggest 
that elites’ behaviour determine how citizens 
respond to a policy and how public opinion 
then is circulated (Wlezien, 2004). Yet, there 
has been a debate about how strong public 
response affects public policy, and vice versa, 
how strong elites and policies influence public 
opinion (Burstein, 2010). 
How i s  publ i c  response  re la ted 
to partisanship? It has been academically 
recognized that elite polarization strengthens 
public partisanship and, in turn, affects the way 
citizens respond to information, and, especially, 
policies (see Bullock, 2009; Druckman et al., 
2013). Others suggest that partisan supports 
on presidential policies, in some extent, are 
explained by party identification such as 
Republicans and Democrats in the US (see 
Foster & Palmer, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
extent to which partisanship influences public 
responses in a context of crisis, a condition 
when a large majority of people are supposed 
to rationally consider their safety first among 
other things, is puzzling.
Partisanship in social media is fairly often 
regarded as participation. Some studies have 
investigated and determined that political 
participation is prevalent in the social media. 
This participation, accordingly, means that all 
citizens are actively engaged in conversation 
of public concern. In some cases, internet 
activities tend to create polarization regarding 
the pros and cons of a political figure or a 
policy. Others suggest that this is not the 
public, but the platform that creates such 
polarization (Jacobson et al., 2016; Lee et al., 
2018). In the Indonesian context, partisanship 
is one of the most plausible explanations for 
voters’ digital behaviour in Indonesia (see, for 
example, Parahita, 2019). In the case of recent 
analyses about Covid-19’s public response on 
Twitter, some display descriptive data about 
the content of tweets (see, for example, Hosseini 
et al., 2020).  
To explain our argument, we divide 
this article into three main sections. The first 
section will be devoted to settling concepts and 
frameworks on partisanship and the nature 
of social media. This section is followed by a 
portrayal of political polarization in Indonesia 
as a background of the argument. The methods 
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that we apply will be explained in the third 
part. Followed by a conclusion, the fourth 
section discusses the findings and arguments in 
an Indonesian context of electorally polarized 
polity. 
Partisanship and Social Media Platform, a 
Conjuncture
Though Campbell et al.’s propositions 
in The American Voter, a pioneering work 
in the psychological approach of voting 
behaviour studies known as the Michigan 
school, was originated with a notion of strong 
party alignment as an explainer for voting 
behaviour, they define partisanship as not 
merely an identification of individuals towards 
a political party. In a broader fashion, they 
define partisanship as “an individual’s affective 
orientation toward an important group object 
in his environment” (Campbell in Odegard, 
1960). For decades, vast scholarships on 
partisanship have followed the path of such 
a pioneering definition (see, for instance, 
Bartels, 2000; J. Bullock et al., 2013; Goren, 
2005; Graham & Svolik, 2020). Drawing on 
this conceptual understanding and modifying 
Goren’s (2005) conceptual interpretation of 
the Campbell et al.’s definition, we put leader-
based partisanship here as an individual’s 
affective orientation or attachment to a political 
leader, who paved their way to an executive 
position through electoral competition, based 
on the individual’s feelings of being close to the 
particular groups associated with the leader.
Accordingly, the concept of leader-based 
partisanship meets relevance in the Indonesian 
context. Partisanship toward political parties, 
conceptually known as party identification 
or Party ID, among Indonesian voters is 
significantly low. Compared to a global average 
of 44%, various public opinion polls since 
Indonesian democratization show a decreasing 
pattern of Party ID into a point of only around 
10% or less (Liddle & Mujani, 2007; Mujani et 
al., 2018). The electoral system, such as open 
list proportional representation fully applied 
in Indonesia since 2009, underpins voters’ 
party dealignment; and strong but temporary 
alignment towards political leaders (Bowler, 
in Fisher et al., 2017). In short, political leaders 
play a significant role in determining voters’ 
behaviour in Indonesia (Liddle & Mujani, 
2007).
Scholarship on partisanship or partisan 
identity has been regarded to have two main 
arguments: cognitive mobilization and policy 
polarization (see Heath, in Fisher et al., 2017). 
Proponents of cognitive mobilization suggest 
that changes in individual capacity and social 
mobility affect partisanship. Higher education, 
loss of information, and rising living standards 
lead to partisan dealignment (Dalton, 2007, 
2014; Norris, 1999). Furthermore, Exemplifying 
Trump’s supporters who believe in that 
Trump’s inauguration in 2017 was crowded by 
people as the inauguration of Barack Obama 
in 2009 , Van Bavel & Pereira (2018, p. 213) 
suggest that “partisan identities bias a broad 
range of judgments, even when presented 
with facts that contradict them”. This bias is 
what political psychology mean when they 
say partisans suffer from cognitive dissonance. 
When partisans experience a reality that 
contradicts their beliefs, they are motivated 
to reduce the experience of those feelings. 
Instead of changing their beliefs, partisans even 
level up their commitment by rationalizing 
the contradicting reality and inviting others 
to believe in their judgment (see Van Bavel & 
Pereira, 2018). 
Meanwhile, theses on policy polarization 
argue that level of distinction between (or 
among) parties or political camps generate the 
extent to which the public align themselves 
with particular distinct parties or elites. In this 
regard, the more similar the leaders’ platforms, 
the less partisan the voters. Proponents of these 
theories contend that political polarization 
in terms of policy platforms or ideologies 
drives us to a high level of partisanship (see 
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Lupu, 2014; Berglund et al., in Thomassen, 
2005). Levendusky (2009) argues that elite 
polarization in the late 1990s and 2000s had 
paved the way for the surge of sharpening 
partisanship for Democrats and Republicans 
and that observers did not find such clear 
partisanship in 1970s when both parties 
displayed heterogenous elites.
Based on those two competing arguments 
on partisanship, the case of partisan response 
in a context of crisis management by political 
leaders, as this paper puts forward, arguably 
is pertinent to the thesis of policy polarization. 
The question is how then we measure the 
extent to which partisan response occurs. In 
this regard, Samuels & Zucco (2018) provides 
a constructive category of partisanship in 
analysing a Brazilian context. As shown in the 
Table 1. below, we employ Samuels and Zucco’s 
partisanship spectrum which results in four 
categories of partisanship: hard-core partisans, 
positive partisans, negative partisans, and 
nonpartisans. 
Table 1. 
Samuels and Zucco’s Partisanship 
Category
Yes









No Positive partisans Non-partisans
Source: Samuels & Zucco (2018)
Regarding the partisanship category 
in a notion of individual’s affections toward 
a political leader, hard-core partisans are 
anyone who has strong identification with the 
political leader’s sympathizers (in-group) but 
at the same time has strong antipathy with 
other leader(s) and the related sympathizers. 
Negative partisans mean that individuals do 
not align themselves with one political leader’s 
supporters but oppose another leader and 
the supporters. Positive partisan is a reverse 
concept of the negative one. Nonetheless, 
anyone who has no alignment with such a 
group means they are a nonpartisan. 
Such a partisanship category and debate 
on partisanship are getting more viable in 
social media platforms where people share 
their thoughts and preferences. Social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter 
facilitate interactions among users. Trottier 
& Fuchs (2014) suggest that there are three 
“Cs’ inside social media as forms of sociality, 
namely, cognition, communication, and 
cooperation, which individuals have certain 
cognitive features that they use to interact 
with others so that shared spaces of interaction 
are created”. Furthermore, Kietzmann et al. 
(2011) use a metaphor of honeycomb that 
suggests that there are six functional blocks 
of interdependence in social media, namely, 
conversations, relationships, sharing, identity, 
reputation, and presence. 
In short, those features provided by all 
of the users are the source of information, and 
at the same time, they are active audiences. In 
other words, a gatekeeper theory, a concept in 
social groups initially introduced by a social 
psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1947, does not 
work in Twitter or probably works in a very 
different way. The theory refers to individuals 
who select, reject, or pass certain information 
to their group or community. In addition, some 
agree that echo-chamber effects generated 
through social media’s algorithm affect the way 
people use social media; and in some extent 
shape people’s views, preferences, and belief 
systems (see, for instance, Jacobson et al., 2016; 
Lee et al., 2018). Echo-chamber effects occurred 
when the algorithms manipulate the users only 
to see content that they frequently act on or 
favour. People who mostly stop by reading or 
watching, comment, and share contents they 
like, they will be fed with similar contents in 
their future social media activities.
Features and nature of social media 
platforms generate various kinds of human 
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activities never found before, including 
forms of partisanship expressed in the digital 
environment. Young adults have been a large 
chunk of social media users of partisanship so 
that it is not surprising when they received a 
significant impact from social media though, 
at the same time, they are the drivers (see 
White and Anderson, in Pătruţ & Pătruţ, 2014). 
This occurred in the United Kingdom when a 
17-year old student declared his admiration 
toward the Labour leader in 2015, Ed Miliband, 
in Twitter and his hashtag #Milifandom drove 
a vast number of like-minded sympathizers 
posting memes about the leader (Penney, 
2017). Related to Penney’s story, a study by An 
et al. (2014) finds that what is called ‘partisan 
sharing’ occurred among social media users. 
Though users may be exposed to diverse 
content, they only act positively, such as share 
or retweet, to contents affirming their views 
and beliefs. Sharing features facilitated in 
Twitter and Facebook pave the way of second-
hand political engagement as people produce 
new contents based on contents produced by 
a first-hand media source such as television 
reporting phenomena in place or news reports 
citing original statements from politicians. 
To be sure, there are other forms of activities 
resulted in social media platforms other than 
partisanship. For instance, this is not surprising 
when ‘clicktivism’ has been a term for a new 
activism in the last decade. The term refers to 
any kind of activism that is conducted on the 
internet, especially social media. The main 
purpose is to gather public attention and 
support about a content it delivers (Bell, in 
Harvey, 2014). In this regard, Jeffares (2014) 
even suggests that hashtag in Twitter has been 
a lifecycle of policy ideas.
Founded on the conjuncture between 
polarization argument of partisanship and the 
nature of social media platforms, this article 
further addresses empirical notions about how 
such digital-driven partisanship juxtaposes 
with a context of crisis, namely, the Covid-19 
pandemic in Indonesia. It is idiosyncratic to 
capture partisanship in social media during 
a crisis where most people presumably are 
concerned about their safety, among other 
things. We, therefore, seek to investigate 
people’s responses to how the most prominent 
political leaders in Indonesia, the president 
Joko Widodo and the capital governor Anies 
Baswedan, respond to the crisis. The two 
leaders arguably personify two competing 
camps—pro Jokowi and anti-Jokowi—since 
the 2014 presidential election (Arifianto, 2019; 
Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; “Polarisation in 
Indonesia,” 2019). “Crisis and leadership are 
closely intertwined phenomena” (Boin & Hart, 
2003). The following section elaborates briefly 
on our rationale for picking the two leaders and 
the camps behind them to probe the partisan 
response. 
Political Polarization in Indonesian Electoral 
Democracy
As elaborated later in this section, there 
are three significant aspects supporting the 
importance of examining partisanship toward 
Jokowi and Anies’ leadership in the context 
of the Covid-19 crisis in Indonesia. First, both 
leaders in the last few months prior to the 
Covid-19 Pandemic in Indonesia apparently 
personify two competing camps stemming 
from the 2014 presidential election. Second, 
Jokowi and Anies hold executive power in 
a presidential system at the national and an 
autonomous administration in the capital 
setting, respectively. Third, due to those two 
points, myriad posts and content in social 
media platforms, especially Twitter, are related 
to how the two leaders handle the Covid-19 
crisis. In this regard, we need to elaborate 
systematically on the three aspects to give a 
sense of political and institutional context and 
rationales of analyzing partisan responses.
Scholarly speaking, Indonesia has been 
undergoing electoral democracy in the last 
two decades since the fall of the Suharto 
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regime in 1998, with five legislative elections 
since 1999—and four presidential elections 
from 2004—to the 2019 general election when 
legislative and presidential elections were held 
concurrently for the first time. Among these 
elections, the last two presidential elections in 
2014 and 2019 resulted in political polarization 
with more than 150 million eligible voters 
across the archipelago. The rivalry between 
Jokowi and Prabowo Subianto—later written 
as Prabowo—in the last two elections has been 
generating two competing camps, namely, 
sympathizers of Joko Widodo, an elected 
president in 2014 and 2019, and a large chunk 
of people opposing Joko Widodo which most 
of them cast their votes to Prabowo. Based on 
the popular vote, Jokowi gained 53.7% and 
55.5% in 2014 and 2019, respectively. It means 
that the rest of the votes obviously belong to his 
rival, Prabowo Subianto in the two elections. 
This neck-to-neck winning resulted in two 
competing partisan groups during Jokowi’s 
administration in 2014-2019 and 2019-2024. 
Later, Prabowo’s sympathizers in 2014 and 
2019 presidential elections were shocked by 
Prabowo’s alignment with Jokowi’s second 
administration. 
Prabowo is the only political figure that 
paves the way for anti-Jokowi supporters 
to give their support. In terms of electoral 
partisanship, there were tangibly conservative 
Islamist groups among Prabowo’s supporters. 
Exit polls data found that urban-modern 
Muslims represented are prone to Prabowo’s 
electoral base while rural-traditional Muslim 
voters are inclined to support Jokowi. Spatial 
results of 2014 and 2019 presidential elections 
show that villagers favour the basis of Jokowi’s 
votes, while most of Prabowo supporters are 
urban inhabitants. In a broad sense, Javanese 
people residing in central and eastern Java are 
key supporters for Jokowi, while Sundanese 
in Western Java to the west of Indonesia, 
especially Sumatrans are sympathizers for 
Prabowo. Other provinces are a mix of the two 
camps. Data of exit polls from various polling 
institutions in the last two elections show that 
rural-nationalist and Islam traditionalists were 
the primary source of Jokowi’s voters while 
urban middle-class and Islam conservatives 
were a large proportion of Prabowo’s voters. 
How then did Anies—a close aide of 
Jokowi for the 2014 presidential race, appointed 
to be a Ministry of Education but fired two years 
later in 2015, run for and win the gubernatorial 
election of Indonesian capital Jakarta—and 
replace Prabowo to personify the anti-Jokowi 
camp? Shortly after he was defeated twice 
in the 2019 electoral combat, Jokowi’s rival, 
Prabowo, ended up in the hands of Jokowi 
when he and the closest aide in his Gerindra 
Party, Edy Prabowo, aligned themselves 
with Jokowi’s second administration as the 
ministry of defense and ministry of the fishery, 
respectively. Prabowo’s shift had confused 
his loyal sympathizers, especially, groups of 
Islamist conservatives. In this regard, the result 
of the gubernatorial election of Jakarta, in 2017 
created a critical turnover of anti-Jokowi camps 
when Prabowo was no longer a personification 
of anti-Jokowi sentiments. 
Similar to the rise of Jokowi when he won 
the gubernatorial election in Jakarta in 2012. This 
‘provincial’ election in 2017 soon was to gain 
national attention due to its vast publication 
around the archipelago. Initially contested by 
three candidates in a pair, the Jakarta election 
had been a proxy of three major patrons with 
their sympathizers. Contending the incumbent 
Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama—Jokowi’s 
vice governor in the 2012 capital election—
backed with Jokowi and PDIP, Agus Harimurti 
Yudhoyono came to the race as the retired 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s elder son while 
Anies Baswedan and his vice gubernatorial 
candidate Sandiaga Uno were viewed as 
Prabowo Subianto’s protégé. In the first round, 
Agus was eliminated with only 17% of share 
of votes while Ahok and Anies who gained 
40 and 43% electoral supports, respectively, 
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passed through the second round. In short, 
Anies won the heated election with 58% of the 
share of votes over Ahok. 
To be sure, marches of Islamists in the 
capital condemned Jokowi and blamed the 
leader of the prominent Islamic vigilante 
group FPI. Capturing these waves of Islamist 
mobilization, Mietzner et al.’s (2018) study 
shows that Islamist political attitudes increased 
afterward, driven by what they called 
entrepreneurs of grievances, namely, a group 
of Islamic prayers fuelling such mobilization. 
Street demonstrations and rhetoric against 
Jokowi-backed incumbent candidate for 
gubernatorial election of Jakarta capital then 
amplified throughout the archipelago setting 
a fire for anti-Jokowi sentiments. While they 
toppled the incumbent governor of Jakarta 
Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama down, 
supports of the Islamists and anti-Jokowi voters 
to Anies are prevalent.
Such electoral polarization and partisan 
activities that are related to the presidential 
seat have long been contested by all politicians 
and their supporters. Though Indonesian 
presidential experiences were trapped in 
the coalitional dynamics of the multiparty 
system (Hanan, 2014; Yuda A. R, 2010), the 
president constitutionally is the single chief 
executive who has vast authority for political 
decisions and public policies, including in 
a crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic. In 
this regard, Jokowi has been portrayed as 
being a president who effectively exploits the 
presidential authorities, from public policies 
to political interests (see Mietzner et al., 2018; 
Mietzner, 2016). Meanwhile, the partisan shift 
from Prabowo to Anies affirms theoretical 
propositions about the short-term effect of 
leader-based partisanship relative to party-
based partisanship. The gubernatorial seat 
of Indonesian capital is an excellent place to 
exercise similar authorities to the presidential 
post due to Jakarta’s autonomy (see Law 
No. 29/2007). Despite lower administration 
and smaller populations, political leadership 
in the capital is a showcase for the national 
audience. Besides, Anies’ political rhetoric 
in many instances shows that he is eager to 
depict himself not only as a leader holding an 
executive seat at the provincial level but rather 
a national leader speaking to all the people in 
the country. This rhetoric suggests that Anies 
may desire the top position for any politician’s 
career, namely, the presidential seat. 
Briefly, the political trajectory of electoral 
polarization, personified by Jokowi and Anies, 
is intertwined with institutional advantage 
attached in the presidential system and the 
exclusive autonomy of state capital of Jakarta. 
The confluence of the electoral dynamics and 
institutional authorities generate massive 
supporters for Jokowi and Anies scattered 
in social media platforms, especially Twitter. 
The following section explains how these 
supporters overtly express their partisan 
response toward the two leaders. 
Methods
First of all, it is essential to capture Twitter 
data as a proxy for public responses since 
Indonesia has been one of the ten countries 
with the most Twitter users by April 2020 (see 
Clement, 2020). Additionally, data and related 
sources from Twitter has long been applied 
by academics to measure and examine public 
opinion in the last decade (see, for instance, 
Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013; Gruzd & Mai, 
2020; Kwon et al., 2016; Small, 2011). This 
article, thus, employs Twitter analysis to extract 
useful patterns and intelligence in online 
conversations and interactions. It is done by 
going through activities such as data collection, 
monitoring, analysis, summarization, and 
visualization. Fan and Gordon (2014) described 
social data analysis in three main steps: capture, 
understand, and present. Capture consists 
of gathering, preprocessing, and extracting 
pertinent information and data from various 
sources. Understand means that we need to 
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remove noisy data and perform advanced 
analytics such as opinion mining, sentiment 
analysis, topic modeling, social network 
analysis, and trend analysis. Lastly, present 
means that we need to summarize and evaluate 
the findings from the stage of understanding 
and present the findings. 
This research uses Twitter as a data 
source. By using crawling data from Twitter, 
this article employs text and social network 
sources that can be analysed based on Fan and 
Gordon’s social data analysis method. Data is 
gathered using Twitter API for Python by using 
two different methods. The first method is by 
gathering data that contains general keywords 
related to the issue, and the second one is by 
gathering tweets from accounts of predefined 
main actors. Relevant corpus and corpora 
(keywords) for our NLP analysis are defined as 
follows: corona, coronavirus, covid19. covid-19, 
korona, koronavirus.
Focusing on the case of conversations 
related to Jokowi and Anies as public leaders, 
we specifically analyse types of Twitter accounts 
related to the two figures: the personal and 
affiliated accounts. We do not take into account 
whether or not both leaders’ accounts may be 
operated by a team for social media management 
or be managed by the two individuals. All their 
posts must be under the leaders’ knowledge. 
Predefined main actors are based on Anies’ and 
Jokowi’s main official accounts and other official 
accounts associated with them. Tweets are 
captured from @jokowi and @PDI_Perjuangan 
as Jokowi’s personal and affiliated accounts, 
respectively. As such, @aniesbaswedan and @
DKIJakarta are Anies’ personal and affiliated 
accounts. Both Twitter data capture methods are 
done on the same set of dates between March 
2, 2020, and April 17, 2020. March 2 is chosen 
as the beginning of data capturing because that 
was the date when the first case of COVID-19 in 
Indonesia was announced. Initially, both groups 
of data are being analysed separately to gain 
initial information.
Each account will be traced to its statements 
related to the handling and responses of the 
Covid-19 pandemic posted during the Covid-19 
outbreak in March 2020. These statements 
obviously contain political decisions, positions, 
and policies taken in response to the pandemic. 
Afterward, kinds of responses of the corpus and 
corpora about Covid-19 we define previously 
towards the two chief executives’ leadership 
and their Twitter accounts are examined 
through two types of analyses.: NLP and SNA. 
Firstly, to get into the more analytical 
investigation, we employ Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) in order to dig into the 
social media user’s sentiments, divided largely 
into positive, neutral, and negative. We then 
accordingly trace the accounts owning such 
sentiments based on the groupings and 
categories. Then, spatial analysis is employed to 
link and match the maps of sentiments, namely, 
positive-map and negative-map about the two 
chief executives. The maps of average electoral 
supports of the two camps are based on the last 
two elections in 2019 and 2014 on the basis of 
the provincial level. 
The technical procedures of NLP’s data 
collection and analysis are as follows. Data 
preprocessing is done by cleaning stop words 
and text stemming. Both steps are preceded 
by tokenization or splitting the sentences 
into words. Stop words are not relevant in 
observing the main idea of a tweet or sentence; 
hence, stop word removal is an important step 
to get cleaner data. Stemming is a process of 
removing the prefix and suffix of a word to 
gain the base form of the word itself (Müller 
& Guido, 2016). It is done to avoid possible 
duplicates in finding words that represent the 
main ideas of the data.
Then, tweets were categorized into 
three different groups based on mentioned 
actors: Anies Baswedan and Joko Widodo. 
Tweets that contain words such as anies, 
baswedan, abw, gubernur dki and joko, 
widodo, Jokowi, jkw, presiden are separated 
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into two different groups. There is a third group 
listed as others that does not belong to the first 
two groups. Sentiment analysis is also practiced 
by using the Naive-Bayes method. Naïve-Bayes 
is a classification method that provides efficient 
analysis with a small batch of the training set 
(Müller & Guido, 2016). This gives us flexibility 
in terms of the number of data acquired and 
analysed.
Data merger is done towards tweets 
captured by using general keywords and 
tweets captured from four predefined main 
actors. Then, data is filtered in order to clean 
tweets that are not directly related to Anies and 
Jokowi based on categorization done before. In 
this process, tweets from @DKIJakarta and @
PDI_Perjuangan were also filtered out.
Secondly and importantly, Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) is applied in order to investigate 
further affiliation among accounts identified 
through the NLP at the previous stage. This 
analysis revealed a connection between one 
account and another one especially, accounts 
operated by political figures. A final SNA 
approach is made to assess interconnectivity 
between data, grouped tendencies, and main 
actors related to the COVID-19 issue. The 
SNA is displayed in three different color-
coding methods: sentiment, partisanship, and 
a combination of sentiment and partisanship. 
This allows a thorough observation on two 
different labels (sentiment and partisanship) 
and its relation to the formed clusters of 
connection. 
Based on categorization and sentiment 
analysis, charts and social network visualization 
are projected in order to assess tendencies 
and possibly further analysis in our data. A 
descriptive chart is able to project number or 
ratio of a given parameter effectively (Chen 
et al., 2008). SNA provides patterns and 
connectivity insight into social media data 
(Himelboim, in Matthes et al., 2017). The results 
brought us to further examine the data by 
merging and filtering processes.
Results and Discussion
Partisan Response in Crisis
Overall, our data crawling finds a total 
of 21,095 tweets captured between March 2nd, 
2020, to April 17th, 2020, that were related to 
Covid-19. Further, NLP analysis suggests that 
there are 849 tweets categorized in either Anies 
or Jokowi topics. In this regard, 284 and 565 
of those tweets discussed Anies and Jokowi, 
respectively. As displayed in Figure 1, we found 
the highest count of tweets in early April 2020 
related to both Jokowi and Anies in response 
to the crisis of Covid-19. It was publicly known 
that during this period, there was a debate 
between the Jokowi administration at the 
national and Anies’ Jakarta administration 
regarding the authority of quarantine policy 
in Jakarta (see Setiawan, n.d.). 
A closer look at our sentiment analysis 
finds that Anies and Jokowi received 59.5% 
and 70% of negative responses from Twitter 
users, respectively. In contrast, positive 
responses toward both leaders are relatively 
fewer with 27.9% and 6.7% for Jokowi and 
Anies, respectively. This finding of sentiment 
analysis and the time series data shows that 
support and demands toward the ways the 
two leaders handle the crisis conform to a 
tendency of partisanship. However, our NLP’s 
spatial data processing finds that there is no 
reliable provincial-level analysis since there 
are very few Twitter users who activated 
location coordinates (latitude and longitude) or 
declared their place in the Twitter account. As a 
result, no provinces have representative Twitter 
users to be analysed further. There are only 34 
detected users in Jakarta and 20 users in West 
Java. The other provinces have less than ten 
users who activated or declared their location. 
Based on the SNA’a visualization displayed 
in Figure 2 below, we can see two clusters of 
the Anies category and Jokowi category, both 
emphasized by the official account of the two 
political figures. Our data captured primary 
interaction from both accounts in regard to a 
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separate process, whereas tweets from both 
accounts were specifically gathered. However, 
in the other SNA that shows the two-leader 
connection, we are able to gain insight into how 
both sides are interconnected. More relatively 
big clusters talked about Joko Widodo than 
Anies Baswedan. Meanwhile, @jokowi, Joko 
Widodo’s official Twitter account, is visibly on 
a distant connection with other nodes, while 
smaller Joko Widodo clusters spread near 
smaller Anies Baswedan clusters.
Importantly, statistics of the SNA analysis 
as shown in the Table 2 below results in a 
modularity value 0.707 which means close to 
1.0, a maximum value of polarization among the 
accounts who are connected with the topic. This 
modularity value indicates a polarized pattern 
towards two major categories. Furthermore, 
the network has 6321 nodes that constitute 
the number of Twitter accounts connected in 
the topic of Covid-19 in regard to Jokowi and 
Anies leadership. The edges or connections 
(line in visualization) among the nodes are 
6699 meaning that there a few accounts who 
have multiple interactions, indicated with the 
average degree of 1.06. In addition, the value 
of network diameter is only 4.0, meaning that 
there are four maximum accounts for content 
to travel. In short, such a polarization indicated 
by modularity value is quite high while still 
depicting close proximity between the clusters 
and even relatively distant individual nodes. 
Figure 1. NLP’s Time Series Analysis
Comparison Between Jokowi’s and Anies’ Partisan Response
Source: Obtained and analysed from primary data on Twitter, March 2 - April 17, 2020.
Note:  Total tweets per day color-coded by topics in which the blue-colored line belongs to Anies 
Baswedan and red-colored line belongs to Joko Widodo.
Table 2. 
Statistics of SNA about Public 
Responses Toward Jokowi and Anies 




Average degree (interactions) 1.06
Network diameter (longest distance 
between nodes)
4.0
Modularity (heterogeneity/cluster level) 0.707
Source: Obtained and analysed from primary data 
on Twitter, March 2 - April 17, 2020.
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A more careful assessment shows that 
more nodes gravitate towards @aniesbaswedan 
rather than @jokowi, although more interactions 
are Jokowi-related. This is described in Table 4 
as closeness and betweenness centrality value. 
Closeness centrality shows how influential a 
node is due to its proximity or closeness to 
other nodes with a high amount of connectivity. 
Meanwhile, betweenness centrality identifies a 
node that serves as a bridge between one cluster 
and another (Cherven et al., 2015).
It is shown in betweenness centrality 
value that the @aniesbaswedan account has 
more importance in generating connections 
between one node and another that is not 
directly interconnected. It is also visible in 
how different categories and sentiments of 
connections gravitated more towards the @
aniesbaswedan account. In terms of closeness 
centrality, non-official accounts tend to have a 
smaller number which show less proximity to 
other highly-connected nodes.
Analysis of the SNA statistics above has 
driven our argument that the extent to which 
partisanship response is quite high with less 
than 0.5 means low, around 0.5 is medium, and 
1.0 is the highest polarized network referring 
to the value of modularity while considering 
Figure 2. 
SNA about Public Responses Toward Jokowi and Anies During Covid-19
Source: Obtained and analysed from primary data on Twitter,  March 2 - April 17, 2020.
Note: color-coded network visualization: red for Jokowi and blue for Anies.
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the number of nodes and edges. A more in-
depth analysis is needed to investigate further 
how then the partisan responses work and are 
distributed between the two competing camps. 
In this regard, as shown in Figure 3 below, a 
combined network analysis on sentiments, 
which are, in turn, indicated as partisanships 
are presented. To be sure that all tweets 
coming from @aniesbaswedan and @jokowi are 
considered neutral.  On the sentiment-based 
network, we can see that only a small portion 
of connections are polarized between positive 
or negative. The rest of the edges show neutral 
tendencies, as also described in Table 5. Many 
positive and negative sentiment connections 
about Jokowi are closely tied with connections 
about Anies or the @aniesbaswedan account. 
Meanwhile, @jokowi is in its own cluster with 
several connections also with big clusters of 
connection related to Anies. This shows that 
most accounts have single category-sentiment 
connection, but several others use both figures 
in showing partisanship tendencies. 
Those accounts led all the centrality 
numbers, most noticeably in degree centrality 
that simply shows the number of interactions in 
and out of those accounts to the others. Another 
official account with high degree centrality 
number is @vivacoid, which is an online news 
account. It garnered various interaction in terms 
of category in sentiment but dominated by 
Anies Baswedan related topics. @rizmawidiono 
garnered more diverse interaction categories 
and sentiments, whereas @billray2019’s 
interactions are mostly categorized as Anies-
negative and Jokowi-positive. Other than that, 
many nodes show a singular category and 
sentiment only.
Table 4. 
Network Nodes Degree Centrality 












@jokowi 2723 1 2724
@aniesbaswedan 1777 10 1787
@rizmawidiono 275 1 276
@vivacoid 223 2 225
@billray2019 128 1 129
Source: Obtained and analysed from primary 
data on Twitter, March 2 - April 17, 
2020.
 Further contextual explanation based 
on the sentiment network analysis reveals more 
evident hints regarding partisan response. To 
be sure, neutral edges (connections) toward 
Jokowi and Anies are similarly enormous in 
spite of differences in number, namely, 6242 
neutral edges for Jokowi and 3417 neutral 
edges for Anies. However, a closer look at 
the number of sentiment networks (edges) 
connected among the accounts as in Table 4, 
negative edges toward the two leaders are quite 
similar with 978 and 983 edges for Jokowi and 
Anies, respectively. Referring to Samuels and 
Zucco’s (2018) category of partisanship we 
have presented in the framework section above. 
This means that there are negative partisans 
of the two camps. Positive edges, on the other 
hand, show different results where positive 
connections toward Jokowi are far more 
extensive with 1200 positive edges compared 
to Anies’ with only 42 positive edges.
Based on Samuels & Zucco’s (2018) 
partisanship category, this means that positive 
Table 3. 
Network Nodes Closeness, Harmonic 
Closeness, and Betweenness Centrality 
Attributes
Account Closeness Harmonic Closeness Betweenness
@aniesbaswedan 1.0 1.0 18560
@jokowi 1.0 1.0 3058
@rizmawidiono 0.67 0.75 670
@mas_piyuuu 0.52 0.54 451
@vivacoid 1.0 1.0 446
Source: Obtained and analysed from primary 
data on Twitter, March 2 - April 17, 
2020.
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Figure 3. 
A Combined SNA Based on Category and Sentiment about Public Responses 
Toward Jokowi and Anies During Covid-19
Source: Obtained and analysed from primary data on Twitter, March 2 - April 17, 2020.
Note:  Color-coded visualization of the combined SNA by category and sentiment where cyan-
colored network for Anies-negative sentiment, sky-blue-colored network for Anies-neutral 
sentiment, and dark-blue-colored network for Anies-positive sentiment; and yellow-
colored network for Jokowi-negative sentiment, orange-colored network for Jokowi-neutral 
sentiment, and red-colored network for Jokowi-positive sentiment.
partisans and negative partisans, with possible 
hard-core partisans, toward Jokowi circulate 
and are prevalent during the early period of 
Covid-19 crisis. This means that partisanship 
towards Jokowi during the crisis favours 
Jokowi but dislike (oppose/dislike) the other 
leader at the same time. Meanwhile, only 
negative partisans did firmly present for Anies’ 
edges, meaning that partisanships toward 
Anies are not Anies’ sympathizers but only 
Jokowi’s haters. This finding and analysis 
reflect the electoral polarization in 2014 and 
2019 presidential elections, elaborated in 
the previous section, where the two camps 
are divided by pro-Jokowi and anti-Jokowi. 
To be more precise, the latter camp simply 
personified Prabowo and later Anies as their 
political preference.
Conclusion
We have shown some evidence based 
on Twitter data analysis that polarization 
contributes to the extent to which partisanship 
responses circulate in a context of crisis. Our 
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findings of the natural language process to 
analyse the pattern of conversation frequencies 
across time (time series analysis) and categories 
(clustered analysis) suggest that supports 
and demand towards the two public figures 
indicate positive and negative partisanship 
that replicates previous electoral supports. 
Meanwhile, our combined social network 
analysis indicates a high degree of polarization 
among the thousands of accounts connected 
with the two leaders in response to the crisis. 
Extended analyses of the accounts who are 
the epicentres of the sentiment conversations, 
either positive or negative about Jokowi and 
Anies, uncover connections with their past 
political support. While positive and negative 
partisans—supporters and haters—towards 
Jokowi are relatively strong, Anies’ positive 
partisans are firmly weak, but the negative 
partisans towards him are similar to Jokowi. 
These findings contribute to the debate of 
public response during a context of crisis where 
people presumably prioritise their safety over 
other things. Instead, though there are a larger 
number of people (Twitter users) categorized as 
nonpartisan, partisan-based response towards 
the way of how political leaders handle a crisis 
challenges a rational-economic argument. The 
rational-economic thesis suggests that people’s 
responses toward policies and leaders are based 
on their rational evaluation—cost and benefit 
consideration. Furthermore, our findings 
conform to polarization thesis of partisanship, 
arguing that the extent to which partisanship 
pertains depends on the degree of political/
policy polarization.  
Indeed, partisans in a time of crisis 
signify a high degree of polarization. Yet, it 
does not mean that partisanship weakens 
Indonesian democracy. Partisanship, and 
the polarization that the competing partisan 
loyalties engendered, nevertheless, affect the 
ways of how people perceive political realm in 
a democratic setting. In the case of Jokowi and 
Anies rivalry in Indonesia, we argue that such 
partisan bias is temporary since partisanship 
toward political leaders is believed to be about 
short-lived loyalties. The breadth and depth of 
Indonesian elite-based partisan loyalty found 
in this study, instead of partisan identification 
with political parties, might be explained by 
both the weak institutionalization of political 
parties and the fragile party systems. 
Lastly, given the fact that the Covid-19 
Pandemic is arguably a prolonged crisis, 
the data and analysis we have presented 
obviously may have changed. In addition, 
scholarly articles agreed that partisanship 
toward individuals, such as public officials 
and political elites, are unstable relative to a 
political party or other ideological institutions. 
Thus, further investigation for an extended 
time frame about this topic is needed. 
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